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A B S T R A C T
Protected areas are increasingly being created, managed and owned by private actors, resulting in land grabs
that are often at the expense of local control, livelihoods and biodiversity. Changes in land ownership and land
use lead to new governance arrangements, which are full of paradoxes, alter ownership responsibilities, and
create clashes of perspectives over how nature should be valued and utilised. Conversely, the presence of new
actors potentially also brings about socio-environmental awareness and can open-up arenas for dialogue and
multi-level collaboration. Using qualitative research methods, we considered two case studies in the protected
area, Los Esteros del Iberá, in the north-east of Argentina: the Harvard Management Company’s investments in
industrial tree plantations; and the conservation project of Douglas Tompkins (i.e. the Conservation Land Trust).
Their activities have increased the complexity of socio-political dynamics in the region, leading to contradictions
and conﬂicts, as well as to a strengthened commitment to manage the Iberá region better. Nevertheless, local
communities perceived little diﬀerence between green grabbing and land grabbing, with all land transfers in-
creasing inequality.
1. Introduction
Land grabbing changes patterns of land ownership and land use, and
fosters new modes of land regulation and governance (Brent, 2015).
The exploitation of land and land-based resources by companies also
generates socio-environmental conﬂict, inequality and environmental
degradation (de Schutter, 2011). The implications of land grabbing are
diverse; in many cases, conﬂict over land brings about the further po-
litical marginalization of the groups of people living nearby (Gerber
et al., 2009; Vanclay, 2017a). However, in some cases, land grabbing
may create opportunities for people to beneﬁt from the arrival of new
actors and capital (Hall et al., 2015). In contrast to the typical con-
ception of land grabs – i.e. the large-scale commercial production of
agricultural commodities (Borras et al., 2012a) – land is also being
consumed by an increasing array of private conservation initiatives
(Igoe and Brockington, 2007). Protected areas and other areas of high
ecological value have become vulnerable to land grabbing in several
ways, including: by a policy discourse that promotes neoliberal con-
servation; the increasing demand for ecotourism; the increasing power
of big international (environmental) NGOs (BINGOs); and the opening-
up of local land markets (Büscher et al., 2012; Corson et al., 2013; Igoe
and Brockington, 2007; Holmes, 2014a; Zoomers, 2010). These
neoliberal conservation initiatives are full of controversy (Fairhead
et al., 2012; Vanclay, 2017a).
The entry of new actors in local land markets and the accompanying
changes in control over land alter power relationships and can be seen
as an expression of the shift from government to governance (Corson
and MacDonald, 2012). Drawing on Parra (2010), governance can be
deﬁned as the system of regulation involving the interactions between
and within a wide range of actors (individuals, institutions, NGOs,
companies) at diﬀerent territorial levels and the socio-institutional ar-
rangements in which they participate. Governance is a multi-
dimensional concept that implies the constant renegotiation, re-
structuring and readjustment of the various roles and responsibilities of
governments, civil society and the market (Castree, 2010; Corson and
MacDonald, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2005).
Changes in governance can be manifested in various ways, and the
impacts of these changes have been interpreted, perceived and analysed
from diﬀerent perspectives. On the one hand, scholars such as Eden
(2009:383) state that the passage from government to governance can
entail a “more proactive, preventative and socially relevant decision-
making” and can imply a change “from closed debates and state-led,
reactive and technocratic decision-making to more open, stakeholder-
led debates in a civil society mode”. From this perspective, the
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diversiﬁcation of actors brings opportunities to open-up decision-
making thus empowering citizens (Swyngedouw, 2005). On the other
hand, this transformation can be interpreted as the withdrawal or
erosion of the state from its environmental regulation and social re-
sponsibilities (Fairhead et al., 2012; Klooster, 2010; Swyngedouw,
2005). The growing role of markets and the private sector in biodi-
versity conservation now constitutes one of the key issues in the gov-
ernance of the natural environment (Corson and MacDonald, 2012;
Klooster, 2010; Zammit, 2013).
The empirical focus of this paper is land grabbing in and around the
protected area, Los Esteros del Iberá (henceforth Iberá), which is located
in the Province of Corrientes in the north-east of Argentina. The factors
that aﬀect governance dynamics in this region include the growing
presence of private actors, increasing commodity production under
green pretexts, and private conservation initiatives. We examine two
cases of land grabbing in this protected area. One case focuses on
commodity production, speciﬁcally the industrial tree plantations of the
Harvard Management Company (HMC), the endowment management
fund of Harvard University. The other case is the land acquisition ac-
tivities in Argentina of the late multi-millionaire, Douglas Tompkins,
who through the Conservation Land Trust (CLT) bought large tracts of
land in Iberá, primarily for conservation purposes. Both cases reveal the
social and environmental issues in the ongoing discussion associated
with land of high ecological value being ﬂogged-oﬀ to foreigners
(Corson and MacDonald, 2012; Fairhead et al., 2012; Lunstrum et al.,
2016).
Our two cases of land grabbing can also be considered as ‘green
grabbing’ (Fairhead et al., 2012; Messerli et al., 2013). Our preferred
deﬁnition of land grabbing is: “the capturing of control of relatively
vast tracts of land and other natural resources through a variety of
mechanisms and forms involving large-scale capital that often shifts
resource use to that of extraction, whether for international or domestic
purposes” (Borras et al., 2012a:405). The focus on control in this de-
ﬁnition means that local people do not necessarily have to be expelled
from the land, but rather that their resource access is lost or diminished
(Hall et al., 2015). Green grabbing, a term ﬁrst used by Vidal (2008),
primarily concerns land acquisition for environmental purposes, such as
biodiversity conservation, national parks, carbon sequestration, biofuel
production, ecosystem services, ecotourism, or oﬀsets (Fairhead et al.,
2012; Vanclay, 2017a). Green grabbing adds a new dimension to the
debate over land grabbing in that environmental reasons are used to
justify the acquisition of land and associated resources (Corson et al.,
2013; Fairhead et al., 2012). A sense of environmental crisis in various
forms, e.g. resource scarcity, biodiversity loss, climate change, is also
promoted to legitimate green grabbing (Castree, 2010; Corson, 2011;
Fairhead et al., 2012; Igoe and Brockington, 2007). Green grabbing
causes the displacement of people creating inequality, social impacts
and human rights impacts (Brockington and Igoe, 2006; Fairhead et al.,
2012; Lunstrum et al., 2016; Vanclay, 2017a, 2017b).
Drawing on the two case studies in Iberá, our aim is to discuss the
characteristics of the governance of land grabbing in and around pro-
tected areas. Protected areas are deﬁned as designated spaces that are
managed to achieve the objectives of preserving natural qualities,
biodiversity, and/or cultural heritage (Parra and Moulaert, 2016). In
their creation and ongoing operation, protected areas can have detri-
mental impacts on local people (Brockington et al., 2008; Büscher and
Fletcher, 2015; Holmes, 2014b; Vanclay, 2017a,b). By zooming in on
the most important governance dynamics, we explore how land grabs
and subsequent governance changes provoke socio-political develop-
ment as well as conﬂict. Our focus on land governance also helps to
understand the mechanisms, practices and processes that lead to in-
equality.
With a growing diversity of forms of conservation, the governance
of protected areas has become increasingly complex. Therefore, ex-
amining the roles, responsibilities, activities and interests of the dif-
ferent key actors is even more important (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen,
2014; Hanna et al., 2008; Oliveira and Hecht, 2016). An analysis of
governance is useful to gain a better understanding of land grabbing
from the positions and perspectives of the full range of actors. We
suggest that the multi-level governance character of land grabbing
potentially can lead to positive as well as negative outcomes. Never-
theless, the negative issues arising from land grabbing are frequently
diﬃcult to address because of local contextual factors. Moreover, we
show that the negative implications of land grabbing are experienced
far beyond the boundaries of the land investment itself.
2. Land grabbing and its characteristics
Contemporary research suggests that understanding of the drivers
and impacts of land grabbing is still developing (Hall et al., 2015;
Temper, 2018). Initially, the literature on land grabbing focussed on
local resistance, displacement and the privatisation of land (the new
enclosures) (Borras et al., 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Holmén, 2015), whereas
now land grabbing research goes further, for example, new insights
have revealed that local people are not always against land grabbing
(Hall et al., 2015; Holmén, 2015). In certain cases, local people, and
women in particular, may actively seek to beneﬁt from the jobs that
might ﬂow from land grabbing (Hall et al., 2015). In other situations,
local people engage in negotiation or struggle to improve the terms and
conditions under which land grabbing occurs and the outcomes that
follow (Hanna et al., 2014; Hall et al., 2015). Their actions are directed
to various actors, including the state, investors, the wider public and to
others in the local community. In this struggle, tensions can occur be-
tween diﬀerent groups of local people (Borras et al., 2013, 2016).
Sometimes, people decide not to resist but to adapt to the negative si-
tuation brought about by land grabbing. Recent insights show that land
grabbing creates unintended as well as intended, unexpected and ex-
pected social impacts and political dynamics (Hall et al., 2015; Holmes,
2014a), which was also evident in our research as we discuss below.
Based on research in Sub-Saharan Africa, Holmén (2015) identiﬁed
four reasons explaining why land grabbing occurs: (1) there is a pre-
judice favouring large-scale development over local farming; (2) gov-
ernments have been keen to attract land investments and foreign
money, for example to develop much-needed infrastructure; (3) cor-
ruption and a lack of capacity with government exists in many forms,
including in weak land policies; and (4) there has been misguided
foreign advice. We consider that these reasons play a signiﬁcant role
universally, including in Latin America. With many diﬀerent contexts in
the world, the speciﬁcities of how land grabbing plays out varies from
place to place (Borras et al., 2012b), but there are also generalities
(Edelman et al., 2013). For example, in the Latin American context,
Grajales (2011) emphasised the use of violence in Colombia. Costantino
(2015) suggested that there were relatively high returns on land in-
vestments in Argentina and the myth of the relative abundance of land.
While land grabbing might be a necessary evil for countries to
produce commodities, keep economies running, gain foreign currency
to pay oﬀ debts, or to develop economically (Baird, 2011; Cotula et al.,
2009; Fairhead et al., 2012), the negative eﬀects of land grabbing on
local people are extensive (Fairhead et al., 2012; Messerli et al., 2013).
From a social perspective, the established impacts of land grabbing
include violation of human rights, ignoring customary land rights, li-
velihood changes, forced evictions, and the criminalization of local
people as they take action to protect their interests (Brent, 2015; Hanna
et al., 2016a; Holmes, 2014a; Messerli et al., 2013; Vanclay, 2017b).
The main negative consequences from an environmental perspective
are biodiversity loss, ecosystem changes, water shortages, and pollution
(Svampa and Viale, 2014). Land grabbing can lead to loss of income and
job opportunities, reduced possibilities to own land in the future, in-
creased land prices, and increased inequality with land ownership
shifting into the hands of elites (Costantino, 2016; Davis et al., 2014).
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3. The governance dynamics of land grabbing in protected areas
Land grabs have introduced many changes to institutional ar-
rangements and power dynamics (Borras et al., 2013; Corson, 2011;
Margulis et al., 2013). A wide range of actors in diverse institutional
settings at diﬀerent spatial levels are now inﬂuencing, mediating and
negotiating territory (Brent, 2015; Margulis et al., 2013). Manifesta-
tions of new forms of land governance include the policies, standards
and guidelines of global institutions (e.g. FAO, 2012), the various cer-
tiﬁcation schemes of industry bodies (e.g. FSC, 2015), and what is be-
coming known as good international industry practice (GIIP). Although
certiﬁcation schemes arguably have the potential to improve environ-
mental and social governance (Dare et al., 2011; Eden, 2009; Fortin and
Richardson, 2013), they have been criticized for prioritizing economic
over social and environmental issues, and for not protecting informal
land users (Cook and Swyngedouw, 2012; Fortin and Richardson,
2013).
New governance modes create opportunities for new forms of po-
litical pressure, which local resistance groups use to advance their
causes (Hanna et al., 2016a, 2016b). With the roles and responsibilities
of the state and other actors being continuously negotiated and dis-
puted, new modes of action for local people are created, as are new
ways by which powerful actors can impose their agendas (Hall et al.,
2015). Often, the interests of the local community are not heeded and
thus they will likely consider diﬀerent strategies, often at diﬀerent le-
vels, in an attempt to have their concerns addressed (Moulaert et al.,
2014), a phenomenon Swyngedouw (2005) called ‘scale-jumping’.
Various systems of conservation can be observed, arising from the
increasingly-varied strategies for protecting nature (Büscher et al.,
2012; Büscher and Fletcher, 2015; Hanna et al., 2008; Igoe and
Brockington, 2007; Parra, 2010; UN, 1992). The concept of neoliberal
conservation is used to explain this diversiﬁcation. Neoliberal con-
servation refers to the introduction of market mechanisms to the ﬁeld of
nature conservation. This leads to stakeholders other than the state, i.e.
private actors, having an active role in protecting nature, as well as to
the opening-up of opportunities to derive proﬁt from conservation ef-
forts (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). Neoliberal conservation is under-
taken in diﬀerent forms, by diﬀerent actors, at diﬀerent levels (Corson,
2011). It is sometimes suggested that local communities can beneﬁt
from these new conservation modes, e.g. in terms of ability to establish
or join conservation-related businesses (Igoe and Brockington, 2007;
Zammit, 2013). However, land grabbing for conservation by private
actors can have many negative impacts, which are extensively discussed
in the literature on neoliberal conservation and green grabbing (Holmes
and Cavanagh, 2016; Jones et al., 2017; Vanclay, 2017a).
Allegedly neoliberal conservation is more “democratic, eﬃcient,
equitable, and proﬁtable” (Igoe and Brockington, 2007:433). In prac-
tice, however, many contradictions can be observed (Büscher and
Fletcher, 2015; Castree and Henderson, 2014; Cundill et al., 2013). On
the positive side, diverse civil society engagement in nature conserva-
tion programs can create new spaces and institutions to protect nature
(Stolton and Dudley, 2010). Protected areas are increasingly being es-
tablished and run by various forms of non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and not-for-proﬁt organisations (NFPs), often funded by do-
nations (Corson, 2011; Vidal, 2008). Moreover, the growing pressure on
governments from these actors may lead to a renewed state interest in
conservation activities and the expansion of protected areas (Büscher
et al., 2012; Holmes, 2014a).
More critically, however, contemporary conservation programs may
facilitate a further withdrawal of the state from the protection of nature
given that other actors are taking over this task (Corson, 2011). Private
actors operating in conservation areas have frequently been criticized
for utilizing nature for commodity production, or ‘ﬁctitious conserva-
tion’ (Büscher and Fletcher, 2015). Their productive uses may harm
biodiversity or local people, especially where limited regulation may
require, allow, or at least not prevent environmental degradation
(Büscher and Fletcher, 2015; Castree and Henderson, 2014; Holmes,
2014a; Igoe and Brockington, 2007).
The rhetoric behind conservation schemes tends to be characterised
by entwined, overlapping and complex reasonings that make their aims
and determination of success diﬃcult to assess. This can be illustrated
by an example from Oliveira and Hecht (2016), who explained that
some environmental NGOs in Brazil advocate for the intensiﬁcation of
harmful production practices (that they formerly resisted) in the in-
terests of ‘land sparing’. These NGOs argued that intensiﬁcation of some
land has the potential to reduce the extent of conversion of other land
(potentially of high ecological value) to soy production (thus saving or
sparing it). The use of catch-phrases – e.g. save the wildlife, restore the
global environment, feed the world, stop climate change – not only
reveals confusion about the roles and responsibilities of the various
actors, but is frequently intended to obfuscate (Cavanagh and
Benjaminsen, 2014; Fleming et al., 2014; Oliveira and Hecht, 2016;
Rocheleau, 2015). The extent of the diversity of forms of nature con-
servation raises questions about the meaning, purpose and governance
of protected areas and about the exact roles and responsibilities of the
state, the market and civil society (Holmes, 2014b; Minteer and Pyne,
2015).
Despite the potential beneﬁts new modes of governance bring, the
way governance actually plays out in practice has several unfulﬁlled
promises, which Swyngedouw (2005) suggests are: (1) a more demo-
cratic society – whereas in reality not every group participates or
beneﬁts equally; (2) greater opportunities for involvement – but the
hegemonic inﬂuence of state and market power persist; and (3) greater
transparency – but there is blurred accountability regarding who is
responsible for the various tasks and roles. Governance dynamics in
protected areas are complex and are constantly being negotiated, as we
discuss below in the context of Iberá, Argentina.
4. Methodology for the case studies
Our research was conducted in the region of Los Esteros del Iberá in
the Province of Corrientes in Argentina (see Fig. 1). Iberá has unique
ecological and hydrological qualities that facilitate commodity pro-
duction and attract land investors and conservationists alike. Over the
last ten years or so, two large-scale land owners in Iberá have been the
Harvard Management Company (HMC), which invested in industrial
tree plantations in the protected area and surrounding buﬀer zone, and
the Conservation Land Trust (CLT), which was founded by the con-
servationist, Douglas Tompkins.
The lead author carried out ﬁeldwork in Corrientes in 2014 and
2015. The research methods included document analysis, in-depth in-
terviews and participant observation. Key interviewees within govern-
ment institutions, companies, NGOs, as well as prominent individuals in
local communities were identiﬁed and approached. A process of
snowball sampling was used to ensure all key people were interviewed.
Key staﬀ of HMC and CLT were also interviewed as well as several
people from local impacted communities. A total of 42 individuals plus
4 rural families were interviewed. The interviews covered a wide range
of topics related to land politics in Argentina, the investments of HMC
and/or CLT, and community concerns about these investments.
Informed consent was obtained for all interviews, and other ethical
research considerations were observed (Vanclay et al., 2013). Inter-
views were recorded when permission was given, however most par-
ticipants preferred that the interview not be recorded. Although a list of
key topics to be covered was determined prior to each interview, the
interviews tended to be of an open conversation format. The setting of
most interviews was informal. For example, some interviews were
conducted while the interviewer participated in family or work activ-
ities of the interviewee. Where possible and appropriate, triangulation
was done to validate information, especially of critical or controversial
issues.
N. Busscher et al. Land Use Policy 78 (2018) 572–582
574
5. Background information about land governance and
extractivism in Iberá
Argentina has a federal government system, combining provincial
and national regulations, with each province having its own idiocrasies.
For the past decade or so, the provincial government of Corrientes has
not been politically aligned with the national government. The pro-
vincial government argues that, because of this, it has received far less
discretionary funding than other provinces in north-east Argentina
(Gobierno Provincial, 2015). Along with other historical and structural
factors, this has contributed to Corrientes being one of the poorest
provinces in Argentina (World Bank, 2010).
Corrientes is characterized by a small number of elites owning large
tracts of land, and having one of the highest percentages of foreign land
ownership in Argentina (Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos,
2017; Slutzky, 2014). Surface and ground water resources are abun-
dant, with extensive wetlands and two major rivers ﬂowing through the
province. Corrientes also hosts part of the Guaraní Aquifer, one of the
world’s largest reserves of fresh water (Tujcheider et al., 2007). There is
structural social deprivation, exacerbated by limited employment op-
portunities. The factors that contribute to the persistence of social
deprivation include the poor quality of infrastructure (e.g. electricity,
water distribution, roads, drainage), high unemployment rates, low
education levels and inadequate healthcare (Neiﬀ, 2004; Slutzky, 2014;
World Bank, 2010).
Argentina is known for its agriculture (especially soy) and extractive
industries, and for the export of unprocessed raw materials (Gudynas
et al., 2009; Oliveira and Hecht, 2016; Svampa and Viale, 2014). In-
vestment in agricultural industries has increased in recent decades as
well as land acquisition for conservation purposes (see Murmis and
Murmis, 2012; Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014). This increase in land in-
vestment has had many consequences, notably the displacement of
people, insecure tenure, inﬂation of land prices, and conﬂict (Brent,
2015; Murmis and Murmis, 2012).
One of the dimensions of the land grabbing process is that many
smallholders do not possess formal land titles. Smallholders without
formal title typically live either on land owned by a formal land owner
who is not actively using the land, or on land owned by the state
(Costantino, 2015; Jara and Paz, 2013). Even though the Argentine
Civil Code provided a mechanism for informal owners to gain formal
land titles when they have lived on the same piece of land for over 20
years, people have struggled to exercise this right (Goldfarb and van der
Fig. 1. Location of Los Esteros del Iberá.
(Note that in late 2016 the provincial park became part of a new national park).
Source: Proyecto Iberá (2016) (used with permission)
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Haar, 2015; Leguizamón, 2016). Obtaining land titles based on his-
torical land use or customary rights is complicated and prohibitively
expensive for informal land users (Brent, 2015). In the past, formal title
holders were not particularly worried about communities starting
procedures to gain formal land title, because the land was not seen as
having much value. Now, with a ready market for land and increased
land values, formal land owners are actively selling oﬀ or leasing their
land to land investors, and are becoming concerned about informal land
users claiming rights over land (Jara and Paz, 2013). In some situations,
new investors might (unknowingly) encounter people living on the land
and who have built up rights to this land, which often results in conﬂict.
The government is also actively selling oﬀ land (Costantino, 2015). The
lack of formal land title disadvantages local people, especially when
there are competing claims over land (Costantino, 2015; Messerli et al.,
2013). It also makes the land grabbing process complex, and arguably
increases the social impacts that are experienced.
The factors facilitating land grabbing in Argentina are similar to
those identiﬁed by Holmén (2015) regarding Sub-Saharan Africa dis-
cussed earlier. In Argentina, there is a strong prejudice by companies
and government agencies against rural people because of diﬀering
cosmovisions, values, and levels of land attachment (Bidaseca et al.,
2013). Moreover, smallholders are not perceived as contributing to
economic progress, leading to the view that rural areas are in need of
modernization, which is believed to come with foreign land investment.
Argentina needs foreign direct investment to pay oﬀ its very large ex-
ternal debt (Bidaseca et al., 2013; Gudynas et al., 2009). Indebted
countries are likely to put nature up for sale (Fairhead et al., 2012).
Corruption is also a factor in Argentina, and many non-transparent land
transfers have been facilitated with the inappropriate collaboration of
notaries or land registry staﬀ (Goldfarb and van der Haar, 2015). Re-
garding misdirected foreign advice, the structural adjustment pro-
grammes promoted by the World Bank have led to much protest and
social harm (Brent, 2015; Harvey, 2005). All up, these four factors have
led to an enabling setting for land grabs in rural, urban and protected
areas of Argentina.
Some speciﬁc characteristics of land grabbing in Argentina include
the active role of the state in supporting foreign investors to gain land
(Costantino, 2015; Jara and Paz, 2013). This includes lowering entry
barriers, selling-oﬀ public land, and authorizing deforestation. Some
economic characteristics that provided an incentive for foreign in-
vestors to invest in Argentina were the proﬁtability of agricultural ex-
ports due to the devaluation of the peso. In addition, low interest rates
in Argentina and other countries like the United States also stimulated
land investments (see Costantino, 2015 for an in-depth analysis of
economic factors inﬂuencing the land market).
The protected area, Los Esteros del Iberá, was created in 1983 by the
Province of Corrientes and is now the biggest nature reserve in
Argentina with approximately 1.3 million hectares (Provincia de
Corrientes, 2014). Iberá has a mix of wetland and grassland ecosystems.
The abundance of water and nutrients have led to it being rich in
biodiversity (Silva et al., 2005). Up until 2016 (when the Parque
Provincial Iberá was converted into the Iberá National Park), Iberá had
two parts, the Reserva Natural Iberá and the Parque Provincial Iberá
(see Fig. 1). In the Reserva Natural Iberá (818,000 ha), private land
owners could undertake productive activities providing they adhered to
guidelines like avoiding biodiversity loss and protecting signiﬁcant
habitats (Gobierno Provincial Corrientes, 2015). The water, favourable
climate and high rainfall attracted investors who used the area for a
range of purposes including tree plantations, rice production, grazing,
and conservation projects. The Parque Provincial Iberá (482,000 ha)
was a protected conservation zone dedicated to preserving native spe-
cies and to providing a high quality tourist experience (Gobierno
Provincial Corrientes, 2015).
Despite its protected status, various socio-environmental conﬂicts
have occurred and threats to biodiversity protection exist, including:
the construction of illegal drainage channels and embankments;
harmful practices such as the application of chemicals and fertilizers;
the spread of invasive exotic plant and animal species; and illegal
ﬁshing and hunting (Boletín de los Esteros, 2010). Controversial land
acquisitions are associated with various multi-millionaires, including
George Soros, Gilberte Yvonne Andrée Lovisi de Beaux (a French
banking magnate), and the late Douglas Tompkins (Aranda, 2015;
Cultural Survival, 2014; Pittaro, 2011; Ruta de Arroz, 2011) (see
Table 1). It is claimed by some that their resource use is not consistent
with the special characteristics of the region’s sensitive ecosystems
(Boletín de los Esteros, 2010; Loiselle et al., 2004; Saverin, 2014).
The communities living in and around Iberá are diverse. Most
communities descend from the Guaraní Indigenous peoples. Families
tend to be large with up to 12 children. They engage in a wide variety of
livelihood activities including hunting, ﬁshing and subsistence farming.
Local employment options once included working on cattle ranches,
although this has now largely been replaced by the forestry industry.
Government social welfare assistance is an important source of income.
The vast majority of people do not possess land titles. Local commu-
nities use and drink water from the lagoons as there is no town water
supply system. They have experienced many changes with the arrival of
investors (see Neiﬀ, 2004).
The policies implemented by the provincial government increas-
ingly promote neoliberal conservation practices. Diﬀerent trends in-
dicate this shift from conventional to neoliberal conservation in Iberá.
The province implemented a twofold strategy of increasing biodiversity
while making money out tourism; and increasing access to the park
(Gobierno Provincial Corrientes, 2015). There is an increasing focus on
ecotourism. There is also an increasing number of conservancies, i.e.
private properties dedicated to biodiversity protection or ecotourism
(Gobierno Provincial Corrientes, 2015). Finally, environmental NGOs
are having greater inﬂuence on the management of Iberá.
6. Land grabs in Iberá: Harvard Management Company’s tree
plantations
HMC is a $37 billion investment management fund associated with
Harvard University (Harvard Management Company, 2018). HMC’s
investment portfolio is broadly based, but includes real estate and tree
plantations. Since 2005, HMC has invested in plantation forestry in
Argentina and elsewhere, and its natural resources portfolio was a key
feature of its philosophy of sustainable investment. In 2015, HMC
owned approximately 88,000 ha in the buﬀer zone of the Iberá park.
However, HMC experienced ongoing controversy about its forestry
operations and recent poor investment returns, which in late 2016 led
to changes in leadership and to its corporate and investment strategy
reducing commitment to its natural resources portfolio (Harvard
Management Company, 2018).
Revenue generated from HMC’s investments is used to support
Harvard’s academic programs, provide ﬁnancial aid for students, and
fund research. HMC’s philosophy is to ensure the ﬁnancial sustain-
ability of the fund so that subsequent generations can be supported into
Table 1
Foreign investments in Iberá and its buﬀer zone.
Source: author compilation based on Aranda (2015); Hábitat y Desarrollo
(2014); CLT (2016) and Ruta de Arroz (2011)
Name of investor Area owned (approx)
(hectares)
Main purpose
Gilberte Yvonne Andrée Lovisi
de Beaux
51,000 rice production
George Soros 76,500 rice production
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the future, as well as demonstrating a commitment to sustainable in-
vestment, speciﬁcally to the six Principles for Responsible Investment
(PRI, 2016). Although minor in terms of HMC’s total ﬁnancial position,
as at 2015, HMC had planted over 100 million trees and owned ap-
proximately 242,800 ha of land worldwide, about half of which was
reserved for conservation (Hoyle, 2014). Before the change in corporate
strategy in late 2016, the HMC story was ostensibly ‘green’ in that it
presented itself as being in the business of sustainable investment,
committed to the sound management of environmental, social and
governance factors, and in bringing beneﬁts to local people.
HMC’s plantations in Corrientes were managed by two subsidiaries
it acquired, Empresas Verdes Argentina Sociedad Anónima (EVASA), and
Las Misiones. HMC had a minority holding in these companies from
2007, gaining full ownership in 2010. The operations of EVASA and Las
Misiones created some 200 permanent jobs. All HMC tree plantations in
Iberá have been FSC certiﬁed since 2014 (Business Wire, 2014).
Nevertheless, several problems have been noted by local people (dis-
cussed further below).
The area surrounding HMC’s plantations in Iberá is diverse, with
small settlements, villages and towns. They have all been aﬀected by
HMC’s plantations, albeit in diﬀerent ways, especially as a result of land
acquisition by EVASA and Las Misiones. They are also aﬀected by the
increasing demand for land by other actors. Our research participants
expressed concern about how the expansion of tree plantations has led
to an uncertain land tenure situation. This concern was taken up by the
local NGO, Unión Campesina, whose mission is to improve the life of
poor people in rural areas of Corrientes. In response to the fear of
further plantation expansion that is held by most villagers, for several
years Unión Campesina pressured the provincial government to for-
malize informal land holdings, which was achieved in 2014. As a pre-
caution against land grabbing, one condition associated with being
granted formal land title is a prohibition on selling the land for ten
years after formal title is given (see also Partido Comunista
Revolucionario de la Argentina, 2014). Another condition is that the
land can never be used for industrial forestry. However, people who
have not sought or been able to secure formal title have continued to be
vulnerable to land speculators. Some interviewees described being
visited by people working on behalf of forestry companies in the region
(not EVASA and Las Misiones) who sought to induce them to leave their
land. An implication of this would be, should they leave their land, this
would potentially invalidate their ability to later claim formal title.
Encounters with forestry company representatives were generally dis-
tressing to local people.
There were also controversies around the way EVASA and Las
Misiones acquired land. We were told HMC had gained possession of
public land. Although the conversion of public land to private owner-
ship is common in Argentina (Sili and Soumoulou, 2011), it is con-
troversial because normally there are people and communities living on
public land (Bidaseca et al., 2013). Therefore, the question arises as to
what happened to the people previously living on the land acquired by
HMC’s subsidiaries. Our sources suggest that there were people pre-
viously living on this land and that a large number of families were
displaced. Even though there are no publicly-available records of
compensation or resettlement arrangements, we understand that people
were induced to leave voluntarily and that adequate compensation was
provided. In our interviews with local people, this was generally con-
ﬁrmed, but it was noted that there was dissatisfaction with the level of
compensation and the process used to gain land. One interviewee
mentioned that the people who left no longer live in rural areas and
therefore are in poverty because they lack the ability to engage in
subsistence activities and have been unable to establish other liveli-
hoods. The lack of land title and uncertainty about who has land rights
has exacerbated the conﬂict around the competing claims over land.
Although the provincial government was keen to sell land to raise
revenue, local people considered they did not beneﬁt from land sales
and they were concerned about corruption. They thought the
government had a vested interest in not acknowledging the land rights
of people living on public land.
The expansion of plantations in Corrientes has led to wider social
transformation, as it required a change in the amount and nature in the
available work from that associated with cattle ranching to forestry. In
general, this change in work activities was not favoured by local people.
With the large number of heavy trucks transporting logs and equip-
ment, there has been a deterioration and diminished accessibility of
roads, which were already badly maintained. Because of increased
traﬃc, there has been an increase in dust, risk of accidents, and other
health and safety issues. Although these issues are not solved, EVASA
made improvements to the road following complaints from villagers
(Oakland Institute, 2013). Finally, people now living close to planta-
tions have lost their sense of place and aesthetic enjoyment of the
landscape. Instead of open spaces, people are now surrounded by a wall
of trees. On the environmental side, there has been a reduction in water
availability because of the high water consumption of plantation trees.
The lowering of the watertable has aﬀected people’s access to water,
and inﬂuences their ability to cultivate food. One interviewee said: “the
plantations have been appalling for us … we used to have a bucket well
that was only 2.5m deep … nowadays we need a shaft more than 10m
deep to get water”.
A controversial point about HMC was its FSC certiﬁcation, espe-
cially because one of its plantations was in an area of high conservation
value. Industrial forestry operations in the Iberá reserve potentially
reduce biodiversity and facilitate the dispersion outside of plantations
of species like pine and eucalyptus (Boletín de los Esteros, 2010;
Gerber, 2011; Overbeek et al., 2012). Slash pine (Pinus elliottii) is par-
ticularly prone to spreading (Zalba, 2010), thus is a major threat to the
protected conservation zone. Acknowledging this, staﬀ of EVASA and
Las Misiones said in an interview that HMC will not plant slash pine in
the future. Another controversial point about the FSC certiﬁcation was
the extent of local opposition to the plantations, suggesting that HMC
was not meeting all FSC principles, especially with regard to treatment
of local communities.
Despite these controversies, in our interviews local people said that
EVASA and Las Misiones were companies with relatively good labour
conditions and were considered to be managing the plantations more
responsibly than the local forestry companies. Perhaps this relatively
good reputation was largely due to the malpractice of other companies
operating in Corrientes. Most local companies failed to provide pro-
tective clothing for their employees, had inadequate or no ﬁre pre-
vention in place, and a general neglect of the plantations could be
observed. However, from what was said in interviews, it seemed that
HMC and/or its subsidiaries were potentially failing to ensure their
subcontractors maintained full respect for the rights of their workers.
7. Land grabs in Iberá: the conservation projects of Douglas
Tompkins
Douglas Tompkins (1943–2015) accumulated signiﬁcant capital and
publicity from the success of the outdoor brand, The North Face, and
clothing company, Esprit. He and Kristine Tompkins (nee McDivitt),
whom he married in 1993, have dedicated much of their time and re-
sources to conservation projects.1 Under the umbrella of Tompkins
Conservation, they became noted conservationists and philanthropists
establishing many reserves via a series of subsidiaries in Chile and
Argentina. The Conservation Land Trust (CLT) was originally founded
in 1992, with its Argentinean arm formally created in 1998. Starting
1 For more information on the projects of Douglas and Kris Tompkins see: Our
Story, Tompkins Conservation https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
5sfyGCzqGMc; Douglas Tompkins: Wild Legacy on Vimeo https://vimeo.com/
172053488 or YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2QDnhjkULdM;
and Corrientes Becomes Corrientes Again on: http://cltargentina.org/en/cvsc.htm
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with the purchase of the cattle ranch, Estancia San Alonso, in 1997, CLT
gradually acquired several other properties in Iberá totalling over
150,000 ha at the time of our research in 2015. The land was being used
for a variety of purposes including conservation, tourism, organic
agriculture and biodiversity protection (CLT, 2016; Tompkins
Conservation, 2017).
The Tompkins were arguably responsible for starting discussions
about nature conservation and sustainability in some parts of Latin
America. Their not-for-proﬁt organisations – e.g. Foundation for Deep
Ecology, Conservacion Patagonica and CLT – have established several
private protected areas (Tompkins Conservation, 2017), including the
Pumalín and Patagonia Parks in Chile. They were actively involved in
the creation of the Impenetrable National Park in Argentina in 2014 by
supporting a campaign to pool land donations from individuals, NGOs/
NFPs and companies (Giardinelli, 2015). Arguably with the change in
government in Argentina in December 2015, Kris Tompkins announced
plans for the phased transfer of CLT-held land in Corrientes to the Ar-
gentinean state. A similar arrangement has also been implemented in
Chile. The Iberá National Park, which was gazetted in 2016, is the
largest national park in Argentina (La Nación, 2015). It includes part of
the Los Esteros del Iberá protected area and now covers 700,000 ha
(550,000 held by the state, and the 150,000 formerly owned by CLT
gradually being transferred to the state). In the conditions associated
with the transfer, CLT staﬀ continue to be involved in the administra-
tion of the park and retain some inﬂuence over acceptable uses of the
park (see also Corson, 2011).
Several controversies revolve around Tompkins and their con-
servation projects in Iberá and elsewhere (Holmes, 2014a). Their pre-
sence has produced suspicion and mistrust regarding their intentions.
Although the Tompkins always expressed their wish to transfer the land
to the Argentinean and Chilean states to create national parks, for
countries more used to the exploitation of nature rather than its pro-
tection and low levels of trust in the state, the goals of the Tompkins
were diﬃcult for local people to comprehend (see El Litoral, 2006a).
Irrespective of the intention, a major concern expressed by our inter-
viewees was the fact that a foreigner could obtain such large tracts of
land, which they considered aﬀected their sovereignty. People were
suspicious of the Tompkins and imagined many fanciful reasons for
their presence such as: grabbing water from the Guaraní Aquifer;
starting a military base; and various other illegal activities. Inter-
viewees and media sources denounced his alleged extraordinary proﬁt
making through land sales (see for example La Política Online, 2011). A
range of concerns relating to local communities were also mentioned.
For example, as a result of a land investment surrounding the Yahaveré
community in Iberá, Tompkins was accused of illegally closing a school
and, by fencing the land in question, eﬀectively locking-in or enclosing
the community (El Diario Digital, 2007; Mi Mercedes, 2007). Tompkins
later donated some land back to the Yahaveré community and reopened
access roads that were restricted by his land acquisitions (El Litoral,
2006b).
Another controversy concerned the relationship between Tompkins
and HMC. Actually, Tompkins originally founded EVASA in 2003 (now
owned by HMC). In 2007, Tompkins sold some land to the Global
Environment Fund, which later sold it to HMC (Oakland Institute, 2013;
Pittaro, 2011). As a result of these transactions, Tompkins is still as-
sociated by our interviewees with HMC and erroneously with current
ownership of tree plantations in Iberá.
A further concern for local people was the planned reintroduction of
the jaguar, which was locally extinct because of excessive hunting.
Feelings about the reintroduction were mixed. A small group of people
feared the impact of jaguars on livestock, while the majority of people
felt a sense of pride in having this emblematic animal restored to Iberá.
8. Governance dynamics in Los Esteros del Iberá
There are many factors that need to be taken into consideration
when examining the relationship between land grabbing and the gov-
ernance of protected areas. Iberá is very big and relatively remote.
Responsibility for park management is spread across ministries, poli-
tical territories and institutions. The park has limited resources, and
monitoring and ensuring compliance is diﬃcult. Its limited accessi-
bility, inadequate policy framework, and a general lack of capacity and
resources contribute to making the interactions between key actors
challenging and create ongoing socio-political tension. The limited ca-
pacity of states is frequently given as a justiﬁcation for neoliberal
conservation (see Igoe and Brockington, 2007). To understand the
characteristics of land grabbing in and around protected areas, and the
roles diﬀerent actors play, the key governance processes in our two
cases are discussed below.
8.1. Socio-environmental conﬂict over HMC’s tree plantations
The struggle against land grabbing by HMC (in the form of EVASA
and Las Misiones) and its forestry operations has connected two groups
operating at diﬀerent spatial scales: the coalition, Responsible Investment
at Harvard (Responsible Harvard for short), and the local NGO,
Guardianes del Iberá. Responsible Harvard gathers students, alumni, and
other Harvard community members who demand more transparent and
socially responsible investments from HMC (Oakland Institute, 2013).
Guardianes del Iberá (i.e. Guardians of Iberá) is a local action group
which advocates for local interests and local sustainability concerns in
and around Iberá. Inter alia, it demands stronger regulation of planta-
tions, greater community participation (for example in environmental
impact assessments), and better employment conditions for workers.
In 2013, Responsible Harvard started investigating HMC’s planta-
tions in Iberá in collaboration with Guardianes del Iberá. In the words of
the two students leading the investigation, “we went [to Argentina]
because we knew that research on Harvard’s land grabs in Mozambique
led to badly needed scrutiny of those investments … and a public
spotlight could lead to changes for the better in Argentina” (Bayard and
Wohns, 2014, para 5). An independent thinktank, the Oakland Institute
(2013), published their report, which stimulated Responsible Harvard
to initiate a variety of protest actions, including mounting a worldwide
petition hosted by the online campaigning community, Avaaz, and
holding an event at Harvard University featuring two people from
Guardianes del Iberá who discussed the problems caused by HMC. Ar-
guably inﬂuenced by these actions, in 2014 HMC appointed a vice
president for sustainable investment and signed the Principles for Re-
sponsible Investment (Harvard Gazette, 2014). The Principles for Re-
sponsible Investment contribute to the creation of long-term value by
integrating environmental, social and governance issues in investment
projects (PRI, 2016). HMC’s eﬀorts did not stop new protests, which
drew attention to issues around the foreignization of land ownership in
Corrientes, with HMC as a main target (Cultural Survival, 2014).
Another concern surrounding HMC’s investment in Iberá relate to
the granting of FSC certiﬁcation. A platform of environmental NGOs,
including Greenpeace and Aves Argentinas, has queried how FSC cer-
tiﬁcation could be granted to a plantation in an area of high ecological
value, especially because impacts on local fauna, water balance and soil
fertility were evident (Greenpeace et al., 2011; Pittaro, 2011). They
demanded the voidance of FSC certiﬁcation to any plantation inside the
Iberá protected area or buﬀer zone. They also demanded that speciﬁc
FSC guidelines be developed for wetland habitats, given that the cur-
rent FSC standards do not speciﬁcally address wetland areas.
A further criticism concerns the process of certiﬁcation.
Interviewees denounced how HMC potentially could hide its bad
practices during the pre-announced audits and thus manipulate the
certiﬁcation process (see also Oakland Institute, 2013). For example,
workers without formal work contracts could be asked to stay at home
during the audit. Responsible Harvard and Guardianes del Iberá reported
there was a fear of retaliation amongst employees if they would speak
up about the poor practices (see also Pittaro, 2011).
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An additional issue surrounding the certiﬁcation process concerned
the limited attention given to social issues in the FSC framework in
general (Klooster, 2010; Dare et al., 2011), and especially in the context
of Iberá (Hashmi, 2014). A more sensitive approach to socio-cultural
diversity in the certiﬁcation of tree plantations is needed (see Overbeek
et al., 2012).
8.2. Socio-political development in HMC’s activities
The HMC case also revealed some positive outcomes. Certiﬁcation
has the capacity to stimulate companies and public institutions to im-
prove their socio-environmental standards, with HMC and its sub-
sidiaries setting a good example for plantation management in the re-
gion. This was especially important in Corrientes where working
conditions in the forestry sector were poor. These conditions were ex-
acerbated by the fact that appropriate regulations were not in place to
protect workers or prevent misconduct such as unpaid hours, ex-
ploitation, informal labour arrangements, etc. Stimulated by its FSC
certiﬁcation, HMC and subsidiaries became involved in a range of social
development activities, including: providing transportation for school
children; worker safety programs; and dental health initiatives.
Furthermore, eﬀort was expended on an employee environmental
awareness program regarding garbage management and composting.
Land has been set aside for conservation purposes, and there is strict
environmental monitoring of the plantations, and reduced use of
agrochemicals.
8.3. Socio-environmental conﬂict surrounding Tompkins & CLT
The Tompkins investments and their presence in the region provide
an interesting example of governance within neoliberal conservation.
Their activities have inﬂuenced the management of various protected
areas and have led to contestation and conﬂict (Saverin, 2014). First,
there have been campaigns against the land investments of the Tomp-
kins with the Guardianes del Iberá organized a campaign in 2013 de-
nouncing Tompkins’ land transactions as land grabbing (Radio Mundo
Real, 2013). Second, the large scale of the Tompkins investments has
concentrated land ownership in foreign hands, and has raised questions
regarding land sovereignty, especially whether it was desirable to hand
over Argentina’s say in how land should be used, by who, and for what
purpose. Selling this large amount of land to foreigners (150,000 ha)
was interpreted by local people and the media as a form of neo-colo-
nialism (Garay, 2004). Critical academic debates associate the for-
eignization of land with power concentration and constraints on equi-
table and sustainable development (Zoomers, 2010). Foreign
investments might be prioritized, especially where governments seek to
attract foreign capital by lowering entry barriers and incentivizing
foreign access to land (Corson, 2011; Zoomers, 2010). Summarizing,
Tompkins’ land investments for conservation have been perceived by
Argentinean society with ambiguity. On the one hand, there was
scepticism about their intentions; on the other hand, there was ad-
miration for their projects by those locals willing to collaborate with
them.
8.4. Socio-political development in Tompkins & CLT’s activities
Despite the criticism of Tompkins’ conservation projects, it is pos-
sible to observe the triggering of positive developments in Iberá. From a
social perspective, CLT initiated several projects to reappraise local
culture and stimulate sustainable tourism in Iberá. For example, the
‘Corrientes vuelve a ser Corrientes’ (in English ‘Corrientes will be
Corrientes again’) project played an important role in reinvigorating the
cultural, environmental and social elements that characterize
Corrientes. ‘La Ruta Escénica’ (in English ‘Scenic Route’) project led to
the development of new infrastructure and roads opening new access
points to the Iberá reserve. Both projects promoted and facilitated local
small-scale tourism development. In collaboration with CLT, the pro-
vincial government started a project in which conservation and tourism
are presented as strategic steps to simultaneously stimulate rural de-
velopment and conserve nature (Proyecto Iberá, 2016). Even though
diﬃculties were encountered in implementing these projects, aware-
ness of the importance of conserving Iberá was raised and possibilities
for local initiatives were identiﬁed. However, not all local people have
the capacity to start local initiatives, and therefore a signiﬁcant part of
the community might remain excluded (see Corson, 2011). Moreover,
for many critical academics (Büscher and Fletcher, 2015; Corson, 2011;
Igoe and Brockington, 2007), CLT’s activities can be framed as a capital
accumulation strategy that commodiﬁes nature.
A program that raised ecological awareness was the reintroduction
of locally extinct species, such as the jaguar and giant anteater.
Heinonen (2015, author translation), the director of the CLT, perhaps
somewhat over-enthusiastically stated that CLT is “working on a project
to restore ecosystems and regenerate processes … that have been dis-
turbed by environmental impacts … we are writing history in Latin
America, no other project like this exists where people are working on
the complete restoration of an ecosystem”. However, CLT’s programs
also have contradictions because people value nature in diﬀerent ways.
People living on the fringes of Iberá historically have hunted for sur-
vival and leisure. As observed during our ﬁeldwork, hunting continues
today (even targeting the very animals being reintroduced), showing
how certain local uses of Iberá clash with the ecological values held by
CLT. From a governance perspective, situations like this raise questions
about ideals, representations, and the sharing of the beneﬁts of nature.
All in all, environmental organizations and philanthropists face
various challenges in the implementation of their programs. A long-
term commitment is needed to successfully achieve program outcomes
that are socially accepted and bring beneﬁts to all actors (Jijelava and
Vanclay, 2014). CLT has been very inﬂuential in drawing attention to
the importance of protecting Iberá. The role of CLT in steering pro-
tected areas highlights the positive outcomes foreign land acquisitions
can have (see also Zoomers, 2010). This is exempliﬁed in the recent
transfer of the land titles from CLT to the Argentinean state for the
creation of the National Park Iberá (La Nación, 2015).
8.5. The complexities of governance in land grabs
The empirical material has provided a nuanced overview of the
many governance dynamics present in protected areas. The two cases
show that the eﬀects of land grabbing go further than simply capturing
control over land. Land grabs (including green grabs) introduce changes
to the entire governance system. However, the arrival of foreign in-
vestors is not necessarily the main or only cause of the many social
problems or conﬂicts observed in the deprived rural areas of Iberá. As
pointed out by many scholars (Corson, 2011; Dressler and Roth, 2010;
Fairhead et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2015), it is important to consider the
place-based particularities and histories of each location. The root cause
of many problems of local people is arguably not the arrival of the land
grabbers, rather it is the reduction of the barriers to investment by
governments. With foreign investment bringing in the capital needed by
low income provinces (e.g. Corrientes), governments create a reg-
ulatory environment that is attractive to investors, but which overlooks
the needs and interests of impacted communities. Both cases showed
that the entrance of foreign actors facilitated a concentration of land
ownership and exacerbated inequalities. However, these inequalities
and deprivations have older historical and political roots that stem from
the political and social history of Argentina (Slutzky, 2014). In Cor-
rientes, people have historically felt excluded from development and
this is expressed in contemporary conﬂicts (Slutzky, 2014).
Another challenge companies and philanthropists have to deal with
is the local setting. Local characteristics create operational challenges
for the implementation and operation of investment projects, especially
in a complex context like Iberá. These operational challenges include:
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aligning visions; getting people to think about the future; establishing
participatory and deliberative processes; resolving pre-existing conﬂict;
and implementing an ongoing and sustainable process of development
without entrenching dependency (Esteves and Vanclay, 2009). All in
all, this results in a conﬂictive arena where economic development, the
protection of nature, and social development are diﬃcult to align.
The major problems and sources of conﬂict in Iberá were related to
the weak regulatory role of the state at the national and provincial
level, which has led to enduring social marginalization. There is a long
list of improvements that need to be implemented, including the pro-
vision of essential public services – education, health and infrastructure
– for remote communities, the implementation of better working con-
ditions, and the eradication of unlawful work practices. The provision
of public services by the government is increasingly abandoned under
neoliberalism. There is no clear responsibility regarding how local
people can be elevated out of their current situation of entrenched
poverty.
Civil society groups are another critical component of the system of
governance in land grabs. Various groups are active in raising aware-
ness and the appreciation of the values associated with protected areas.
They deploy diﬀerent strategies in the struggle against land grabbing
like fostering awareness, denouncing bad practices, and demanding
more responsible company behaviour (Hall et al., 2015; Hanna et al.,
2016b; Klooster, 2010). One strategy used by these groups to ﬁght for
their objectives is forming alliances at multiple levels. In our case stu-
dies, it was evident that the demands raised by local groups were rarely
fully met. However, the NGOs had some impact, like increasing com-
munity awareness of issues and enabling local communities to be better
organised and informed. Nevertheless, the spaces of participation are
controlled by neoliberal logic, and governments tend to represent
economic market interests rather than community interests (Kaika,
2017; Swyngedouw, 2011).
9. Conclusion: land grabbing and governance changes within
protected areas
The growing presence of business actors and social elites in pro-
tected areas creates changing, contradictory and multifaceted meanings
for the governance of conservation (Holmes, 2014b). Whereas in the
past, conservation tended to mean only the protection of scenic places,
species and habitats by public authorities with public ﬁnance, now
conservation policies allow a wider range of activities, including pri-
vately-owned parks, ecotourism, and biodiversity oﬀsets and reserves
by forestry companies and other production enterprises. These con-
servation activities are resisted or supported by local communities and
other stakeholders depending on whether the interests, needs and de-
mands of diﬀerent actors are met, the impacts experienced, and the
eﬀectiveness of the engagement processes used (Vanclay, 2017a). Ac-
tions to conserve nature are increasingly being undertaken by inﬂuen-
tial foreign entities. As seen in Iberá, the presence of these actors may
not always harm the environment and/or the local people. However,
even though there may be attempts by companies to do good, there can
always be controversy about their activities.
Land use and ownership changes reinvigorate historical con-
troversies. Even philanthropists and companies with the best intentions
cannot avoid dealing with the local history of the places in which they
operate. Corrientes and the area surrounding Iberá are characterized by
persistent inequality, disunity and socio-political struggle. In such a
context, the Harvard Management Company and Douglas Tompkins/
CLT were easy scapegoats for quick judgements about anything that
was perceived to be inadequate in Corrientes. The socio-political-his-
torical context is typically not suﬃciently analysed or taken into ac-
count in project development, including by HMC and CLT. However,
sometimes the problems may be so complex that they are inherently
unsolvable. As emblematic American actors, HMC and Tompkins have
been the subject of a disproportionate level of criticism. Many other
operators with much worse practices can be found in Corrientes (and
elsewhere), yet they receive less scrutiny.
Even though land grabbing and green grabbing have been criticized
in this paper and elsewhere for placing land in the hands of the few and
for the many misconducts and mistakes made, they may also open-up
spaces for reﬂecting on the environmental values and social responsi-
bilities of individuals, communities, NGOs, governments and compa-
nies. This perspective is not always highlighted. Thus, in the govern-
ance of protected areas, there is a need to ﬁnd a way to bring together
the many diﬀerent perspectives and interests, so that all parties can
contribute and beneﬁt.
As demonstrated in our two case studies, land grabbing led to var-
ious governance changes having positive and negative outcomes. These
changes highlight the failed promises of governance identiﬁed by
Swyngedouw (2005). First, governance proclaims to create more de-
mocratic spaces, whereas in Iberá, poor local people continued to be
excluded and expelled. Second, land grabs are presented by govern-
ments and investors as bringing opportunities for local people, while in
reality the land grabs pose a threat to local people’s livelihoods and may
lead to environmental degradation. Third, neoliberal conservation
promises greater transparency, whereas the involvement of more and
varying actors across scales increases the blurriness about account-
ability, roles and responsibilities.
These three points highlight that governance of protected areas is
dynamic, multifaceted, complex, and does not serve the interests of all
actors. The belief that neoliberal conservation can bring sustainability
(Corbera, 2015; Costello et al., 2012) while continuing to allow ex-
ploitative practices (Cook and Swyngedouw, 2012) is manifestly in-
valid, especially in the Latin American countries where neoliberalism is
much promoted (Parra and Moulaert, 2016; Veltmeyer and Petras,
2014). As argued by Overbeek et al. (2012), local people are dis-
advantaged because of the absence of the state from key social re-
sponsibilities such as education and health. Moreover, governments
support the very industries that are destroying the environment and
livelihoods of local communities. If no emphasis is given to enabling
local people to maintain control over land, rural-to-urban migration
will inevitably occur, leading to people entering the ranks of the urban
poor (Fairhead et al., 2012; Gerber, 2011). These issues promote civil
resistance and reduce the stability of government (Veltmeyer and
Petras, 2014).
Protected areas are subject to both green grabbing and land grab-
bing. Regardless of the term, the impacts experienced are similar in that
local people are displaced or have their use of land and resources re-
stricted, their environments are harmed such that maintaining their
livelihoods becomes impossible, and/or they experience considerable
other social impacts and upheaval. In this sense, green grabbing can be
seen as a type of extractivism. From the positioning of local people,
green grabbing is land grabbing. Facilitating the ability of local people
to gain formal land title, increasing awareness of land grabbing issues,
increasing the scrutiny of land investors by all stakeholders, and in-
creasing the opportunities for local people would go a long way to
enhance the beneﬁts and mitigate the harms from land grabbing.
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